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This chapter relies on a distinction between Confucianism and Daoism 
made during the Han dynasty (漢朝: 206 BCE–220 CE) and further 
perpetuated in Chinese intellectual history. It examines the connections 
between pre-Qin (秦朝: 221– 206 BCE) Daoist and Confucian philosophies, 
focusing on their differences as well as similarities. While it has been 
traditionally accepted that there are many tensions, and even antagonism, 
between concepts and approaches in Daoist and Confucian thought, the 
discussion here also focuses on the historical linkages and philosophical 
continuities that at times blur the distinction between the two. The 
primary comparison here will be conducted at three levels: the individual 
within its environment, the socio-political world, and the cultivation of the 
self. These three levels of analysis are organized in three sections, from the 
more inclusive    to the more specific. However, the sections are only 
theoretical divisions, since both Daoist and Confucian philosophies 
emphasize a concept of selfhood that focuses on an individual’s 
relationships with others, within a larger natural and cosmic environment. 
To more fully understand these comparisons, it is important also to 
examine the intellectual climate within which interactions between so- 
called Daoism and Confucianism took place. These details, including 
information gleaned from relatively recently discovered texts, are not 
merely tangential to our understanding of both philosophies. 
Representations of the two philosophical traditions by thinkers and in 
texts through history are central to how we understand the relation 
between them. Due to restrictions of length, my discussion here will 
concentrate on the foundational period in Chinese intellectual history.1 
 
1It is important to note here that the relation between Daoism and Confucianism 
fluctuated through different periods. For example, during the Song dynasty (Song Chao 
宋朝: 960–1279 CE), Confucians such as Cheng Hao (程顥: 1032–1085) and his brother Cheng 
Yi (程頤: 1033–1107), as well as Zhu Xi (朱熹: 1130–1200), were fierce critics of Daoist thought. 
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1 Introduction 
 
How do we make sense of Daoism and Confucianism in the pre-Qin and 
Han periods? The most influential early narrative of their relationship 
appears in the Shiji (史記, Records of the Grand Historian), which relates 
an account of the meeting between Kongzi (孔子) and Laozi (老子).2,3 
There, Kongzi is overawed by Laozi’s insights on the rites (li 禮), and he 
pays tribute to Laozi by characterizing him as a dragon. This theme is 
given play in a number of texts of around the same period, including in the 
Zhuangzi (莊子)4 and the Liji (禮記, Record of Rites).5 
Although these accounts do not explicitly mention hostility between 
Laozi  (Lao Dan) and Kongzi, there is an implicit suggestion that these key 
figures belong to different traditions. To appreciate the implications of this 
narrative, we need to understand that the Shiji was written in a period 
when historiographers (taishi 太史) held office in the imperial 
administration. Two significant histories of the Han period, the Shiji itself, 
and the Qian Hanshu (前漢書, History of the Former Han), did not simply 
“recount” the events and people of the past. They used the past as 
illustrations of examples to follow, behaviors to avoid, exemplars of 
benevolent rule, and so on.6 Thus ideas were brought into the service of 
political and administrative enterprise (see Schwartz 1985: 237–54; Graham 
1989: 374–6; 379–80; De Bary and Bloom 1999: 298–9). 
In this regard, the antagonism between Daoism and Confucianism is at 
least partly a creation of historiographers to justify their ideologies and 
secure their positions (refer to Loewe 1999; and G.E.R. Lloyd 2002: 126–
147). Still, the theme of antagonism between the traditions continues 
 
2In the Shiji, there are two references to encounters between the two men. The first occurs in a 
chapter on the details of Kongzi (Shiji 47; “Kongzi Shijia” 〈孔子世家〉) and the second in a 
chapter relating to the details of Laozi and Han Fei (Shiji 63; “Laozi Han Fei Liezhuan” 〈老子
韓非列傳〉). 
3Angus Graham believes that the earliest reference to Kongzi’s learning experience with Lao 
Dan is from the Lüshi Chunqiu (Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals 呂氏春秋 ), a text dated 
to around 240 BCE. It mentions three people Kongzi has learnt from: Lao Dan (老聃), Meng Su 
Kui (孟蘇夔) and Jing Su (靖叔) (Graham 1998: 27). 
4In the fifth chapter of the Zhuangzi (“De Chong Fu” 〈德充符〉), Kongzi does not speak 
directly with Lao Dan. However, Lao Dan comments that Kongzi has not acquired complete 
freedom from a number of worldly concerns. In the fourteenth chapter of Zhuangzi (“Tianyun” 
〈天運〉), there is an account of the meeting between Kongzi and Lao Dan that resembles the 
Shiji account. It    is unclear whether the Zhuangzi account may have been the source of the 
Shiji account (refer to Graham 1998: 25). 
5In the Liji, a work of the last century BCE, Lao Dan, a senior, addresses Kongzi by his name 
Qiu (Graham 1998: 26). 
6Burton Watson discusses the nature of these writings: “The function of history…is twofold: 
to impart tradition and to provide edifying moral examples as embodied in the classics. These 
two traditions, one recording the words and deeds of history, the other illustrating moral 
principles through historical incidents, run through all Chinese historiography” (1999: 368). 
 to be a subject of study into the present. While many scholars believe that 
the encounter story between Laozi and Kongzi  was perpetuated  by those 
of Daoist persuasion to assert the superiority   of Daoist thought, in an 
interesting twist, Angus Graham has argued that the Confucians were 
responsible for promoting these encounters because they were keen to 
establish Kongzi’s flexibility in his willingness to learn from others (1998: 
27, 36).7 
It is important also to note that not all thinkers during the Han 
advocated either a Confucian or a Daoist doctrine. Some of them 
synthesized and integrated themes and ideas from different traditions. For 
example, although DONG Zhongshu was  of Confucian persuasion, he 
drew upon the concepts yin-yang (陰陽), qi (氣), and the Daoist notion of 
passivity to explicate the (Confucian) triadic relation between Heaven, 
earth and humanity (Queen, in De Bary and Bloom 1999: 295–310). 
A good example of a text that brings together Confucian and Daoist 
themes is the Huainanzi (淮南子, The Masters of Huainan), written 
around the middle of the second century BCE, either by LIU An ( 劉 安 , 
180?–122? BCE), the king of Huainan, or under his patronage (Major 1993: 
3–5). The text quotes extensively from a range of sources including the 
Zhuangzi, the Laozi ( 老 子 ), the Hanfeizi (韓非子) and the Lüshi Chunqiu. It 
integrates seemingly conflicting views, such as those of Zhuangzi and HAN 
Fei. It also combines the Daoist themes of quiescence (jing 靜) and non-
action (wuwei 無為) with the Confucian concept of human nature (xing 性), 
which is grounded in Heaven’s way (tiandao 天道). The 21 chapters of the 
Huainanzi embody the spirit of Chinese philosophy during the Han period, 
with its tendency to combine concepts and themes from different strands of 
thought.8 
The Yijing (易經, Classic of Change) also played a prominent role in 
shaping the debates of this period. Although its earliest sections are dated 
to around the ninth century BCE, later additions date perhaps from the 
late Zhou dynasty (周朝 , 1122–256 BCE). These additions were called the 
“ten appendices” (Shi Yi 十翼 or Yi Zhuan 易傳). The commentaries are 
philosophically significant for their explorations of the rationale for using 
hexagrams in divination and their focus on the underlying worldviews of  
 
7Graham also argues that the identification of Lao Dan with Laozi, the founder of Daoism, was not current with the story but 
established in stages: (a) Confucians promote the story about the willingness of Kongzi to learn from Lao Dan, probably an 
archivist. This story was current in around the 4th century BCE. (b) The adoption of Lao Dan as a spokesperson for 
“Chuangism”   in the “Neipian” (〈內篇〉) of the Zhuangzi, by about 300 BCE. (c) Lao Dan is identified with Laozi; this 
helps to mark out “Laoism” as a distinctive doctrinal stream. (d) In order to render the Laozi acceptable to the Qin, various 
stories were promoted. These include Lao Dan as the Grand Historiographer who in 374 BCE predicted the rise of Qin, 
journeyed to the west and wrote the book of 5,000 characters for the gatekeeper, Yin Xi (尹喜). This stage and the previous 
one were completed by about 240 BCE. (e) Existing schools of thought were classified, as for instance, into the six doctrinal 
groups in the Shiji. According to this classification, both “Laoism” and “Chuangism” came under one doctrine, “Dao-ism” 
(Daojia). Since Lao Dan’s dates are prior to those of Zhuangzi’s, Lao Dan was identified as the founder of Daoism (Graham 
1998: 36–7). 
8Refer to Charles Le Blanc 1985, John Major 1993, Roger Ames 1994, and Paul Goldin 1999 for discussions of synthesis and/or 
syncretism in the Huainanzi. 
  
 
the Yijing. During the Han dynasty, themes from the Yijing, especially those 
of interdependency, change and transformation, were applied to a wide 
range of issues in cosmology, astronomy, politics, society and its 
institutions, ethics, health and personal well-being. 
Other texts from the late Warring States (Zhanguo 戰 國 ) and Han 
periods, including the Guanzi (管子, Writings of Master Guan) and the 
Huangdi Neijing (黃帝內經, The Inner Canon of Huangdi), also incorporate 
syntheses of ideas from different doctrinal groups.9 
While the close examination of these texts lies beyond our discussion, the 
issue of synthesis is important to our understanding of Confucian and 
Daoist philosophies. It underlies questions including: Did thinkers of this 
time consider Confucianism and Daoism antithetical? If there were 
distinctions between Confucianism and Daoism at different points in 
Chinese intellectual history, what were they, and what were the key 
characteristics of each of these philosophies? 
A set of texts discovered in 1993 at Guodian (郭店), Hubei (湖北) 
Province, were published in 1998 as a collection, the Guodian Chumu 
zhujian (郭店楚墓竹简, The Bamboo Slips from the Chu Tomb at Guodian). More 
than 800 bamboo slips were found in the tomb, and from these, fourteen 
Confucian texts and two Daoist texts, including portions of the Laozi, were 
identified. Robert Henricks suggests that these slips could have belonged to 
a teacher’s philosophical library (2000: 5). The texts are believed to date 
from no later than 278 BCE, and perhaps even before 300 BCE (Liu 2003a: 
149). 
This collection presents numerous instances where Confucian texts seem 
to have “borrowed” from Daoist ideas. These discussions obfuscate precise 
distinctions between Confucianism and Daoism (Liu 2003a: 150–1). Recent 
work on the Guodian texts focus on their significance for philological 
issues, intellectual history and philosophical matters. While the literature is 
too vast to list here, it is important to note that the discussions in the texts 
draw from ideas and vocabulary of what had previously been thought of as 
distinct, Confucian and Daoist, traditions (Holloway 2008; Meyer 2008: 
309–16). One example of this is the Guodian Laozi which, dated earlier than 
received versions of the Laozi, does not on the whole seem to disagree with 
Confucian values and concepts as the received versions do. For example, 
received versions of Laozi 19 are critical of Confucian concepts such as 
sageliness (sheng 聖), wisdom (zhi 智), benevolence (ren 仁), and 
rightness (yi 義), while 
 
9An issue of philosophical interest concerns the nature of these syntheses: were those who articulated the 
various views successful in integrating concepts and themes from different strands of thought? Or were 
the attempts at synthesis only partially successful, resulting in views that incorporated inconsistent mixes 
of concepts and themes? It has been suggested that earlier attempts (during the late Warring States and early 
in the Han period) at drawing together strands from different traditions had limited success; these  
 the same passage in the Guodian Laozi takes issue with intelligence (zhi 知 
) and disputation (bian 辯) (Liu 2003b: 231). According to Liu, the Guodian 
texts prompt us to rethink the relationship between pre-Qin Confucianism 
and Daoism (Liu 2003a: 151). This is an important challenge to the view 
that antagonism between these traditions rests only on deep-seated 
philosophical and axiological differences, rather than historical 
circumstance as well. 
Let us now turn to a comparison of Confucian and Daoist philosophies 
at three different but interrelated levels: the individual within the 
environment, the socio- political world, and cultivation of the self. 
 
2 The Individual Within the Environment 
 
Both Confucianism and Daoism uphold a notion of self that is 
understood in terms of its relationships and its place within a broader 
environment. Daoist texts such as the Laozi and the Zhuangzi express this 
awareness at a number of levels. They emphasize natural events as well as 
human interdependence with other life- forms. They also consider the 
effects of the social and political environment on the individual. 
Discussions within the Confucian tradition show similar awareness of the 
individual’s embeddedness within a larger environmental context.  There 
is, however, an important difference between Daoist and Confucian 
conceptions of self- in-environment as the latter highlights the exclusive 
capacities and achievements of humanity. We will examine this and other 
comparisons in the following discussion. In Confucian thought, awareness 
of the environment is articulated first in terms of the contexts within 
which human interactions occur. The family context, neighborhoods, and 
communities are critical to the development of individuals (Lunyu 論語 
2.5–8, 4.1, 2.20, 12.19, 13.11 and 13.13). The right kinds of contexts and 
interactions with paradigmatic people will facilitate the inculcation of 
relational values such as xiao (孝 filial piety) and ren. Where the leaders of 
society are not guided by a vision of collective human good, individuals 
cannot thrive. This theme occupies a central position in the Confucian 
vision of good government (renzheng仁政). This vision is articulated in 
different ways by different Confucian thinkers. For example, Xunzi (荀子 
310?–219? BCE) argues that a regulatory socio-political framework 
comprised by li (rites, social ritual), yi (rightness) and fa (法 standards, 
penal laws) is necessary for the establishment of orderly society (Xunzi 荀子, 
“Xing E” 性惡). In Mengzi’s (孟子: 385?–312? BCE) philosophy, 
 
attempts and their resultant philosophies are often labeled ‘syncretic’. In contrast, the method of synthesis—drawing together 
different concepts and themes in a more or less coherent unity—is thought to be a characteristic of Chinese thought of the 
(later) Han period. See, for example, the chapter divisions and titles in De Bary and Bloom’s Sources of Chinese Tradition. 
Chapter 9, “Syncretic Visions of State, Society, and Cosmos,” cover texts from the late Warring States to the early Han period (pp. 
  
 
235–282). Chapter 10, “The Imperial Order and Han Synthesis,” discusses texts of the Han period (pp. 283–352). 
a compassionate society is a natural extension of inherent human 
goodness: 
Mencius said, “The ability possessed by humans without having been acquired by 
learning is intuitive ability [人之所不學而能者, 其良能也]. The knowledge 
possessed by them without the exercise of further thought is their intuitive 
knowledge. Children carried in the arms all know to love their parents [孩提之童, 
無不知愛其親者]. When they are grown a little, they all know to respect their elder 
brothers. Filial affection for parents is a manifestation of benevolence. Respect for 
elders is a manifestation of righteousness. That is all; these belong to all under 
heaven.” (Mengzi 7A.15, trans. adapted from the translation by Legge 1981: 943–4)  
In the Mengzi and later Confucian texts, the concept “heaven” (tian 天) is 
the source or ground of human morality (although we need to note that 
tian is not an absolute or transcendent basis of morality). In the Xunzi, tian 
is not only associated with human morality, it also encapsulates the idea of 
the natural world within which humans are situated. The Zhongyong (中庸
, Doctrine of the Mean), a Confucian text dating from around the third 
century BCE,10 places humanity within a broader cosmological context. It 
emphasizes the partnership of humanity with heaven and earth (di 地): 
唯天下至誠, 為能盡其性, 能盡其性, 則能盡人之性, 能盡人之性, 則能盡物之性, 能盡
物之性, 則可以贊天地之化育, 可以贊天地之化育, 則可以與天地參矣. (Zhongyong 
22, Legge 1981: 92–93) 
Of all under Heaven, only the person of complete sincerity can realize his nature 
to the greatest extent. Given that he is able to do this, he can help others realize 
their natures to the greatest extent. Given that he is able to do this, he can help the 
realization of the natures of animals and things to the fullest extent. Given that he 
is able to do this, he can assist in the transforming and nourishing powers of 
Heaven and Earth. Able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers of 
Heaven and Earth, he may with Heaven and Earth form a trinity. (Adapted from 
the translation by Legge, ibid.) 
This doctrine of the human partnership with Heaven and Earth situates 
the Confucian concept of humanity, as well as human achievements and 
human well- being, in a larger cosmological perspective. At the same time, 
it amplifies the status of humanity. In contrast, Daoist philosophy tends 
not to elevate  the status  of humanity but rather to emphasize the 
intertwined circumstances of humans with other beings and aspects of the 
environment. While the Zhongyong passage above stresses the heightened 
role and responsibilities of humanity, Laozi 5 draws attention to the relative 
equality of all things (wanwu 萬物: lit. ten thousand things): 
 
10The Zhongyong was originally thought to have been written by Kongzi’s grandson, 
Zisi (子思) as part of the text Zisizi ( 子思子 ). Contemporary scholars doubt this on the 
basis of extensive examination of its intellectual content (An 2003). 
  
 天地不仁, 以萬物為芻狗; 
聖人不仁, 以百姓為芻狗. (WANG Bi version, Liu 2006: 129) 
 
Heaven and Earth are not centrally focused on humaneness. They regard the ten 
thousand things as straw dogs.11 
The sage is not centrally focused on humaneness. He regards all people as straw 
dogs. (Author’s translation) 
 
The suggestion that Heaven and earth are “not humane” (bu ren) can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. It may be understood as a firm denial of 
the key Confucian concept, ren.  Secondly, it may be taken in a more neutral 
manner to suggest that Heaven and Earth are not circumscribed by 
humanly-constructed notions of morality, especially as encapsulated in the 
concept ren. Third, there is a more positive understanding of this phrase, 
where tian di bu ren is taken to mean that Heaven and Earth are impartial 
and bring positive benefit to all things, not just humanity alone.12 All 
interpretations of the phrase bu ren involve, at some level, rejection of the 
artificial elevation of humanity as a singularly select group. Daoist 
attention to the environment is most prominent in the concept ziran ( 自然 
), which may be understood in terms of naturalness or “unadorned 
simplicity” (Liu 1999: 229). While the concept ziran may refer to physical 
aspects of the natural environment, it most appropriately refers to processes 
 
 
 
11The notion of “straw dogs” is philosophically interesting. Wang Bi interprets the 
phrase to mean “straw and dogs,” referring to the different categories in the natural 
world and how they  are interdependent (Rump 1979: 17). D.C. Lau notes in his 
translation that “[i]n the T’ien yun chapter in the Chuang tzu it is said that straw dogs 
were treated with the greatest deference before they were used as an offering, only to be 
discarded and trampled upon as soon as they  had served their purpose.” (1963: 61). 
According to Lau’s analysis, the straw dog is central to the sacrifice. However, taken out 
of that context, the straw dog loses its significance. If all things are as straw dogs, they are 
significant only within particular contexts. Furthermore, all things, including humanity, 
must pass on when the ‘sacrifice’ is over. Ames and Hall note: “There is nothing in 
nature, high or low, that is revered in perpetuity” (2003: 85). Could this passage also be 
understood as an ominous warning about attempts to elevate humanity? 
12Wang Bi’s analysis of this passage presents the positive rendition of “tian di bu ren”: 
“Heaven and Earth leave what is natural (Tzu-jan [ziran], Self-so) alone. They do 
nothing and create nothing. The myriad things manage and order themselves. Therefore 
they are not benevolent. One who    is benevolent will create things, set things up, 
bestow benefits on them and influence them. He gives favors and does something. 
When he creates, sets things up, bestows benefits on things and influences them, then 
things will lose their true being . . .  If nothing is done to the myriad things, each will 
accord with its function, and everything is then self-sufficient” (trans. Rump 1979: 17). 
 
  
 
rather than the substance of nature. Chung-ying Cheng expresses this 
succinctly: 
. . .  tzu-jan [ziran] is not something beyond and above the Tao [Dao]. It is the 
movement of the Tao as the Tao, namely as the underlying unity of all things as 
well as the underlying source of the life of all things. One important aspect of tzu-
jan is that the movement of things must come from the internal life of things and 
never results from engineering or conditioning by an external power. (1986: 356) 
Two important aspects of ziran are evoked in this analysis. First, its 
approach is oppositional to that which seeks to regulate and coordinate. In 
this regard, ziran is associated with the concepts of simplicity (pu 樸) and 
stillness (jing 靜) (Laozi 37). Second, the approach is articulated in 
conjunction with a philosophical framework that upholds the spontaneous 
and mutual transformation of all things: 
Tao [Dao] invariably takes no action [wuwei], and yet there is nothing left undone [道
常無為, 而無不為]. 
If kings and barons can keep it, all things will transform spontaneously [侯王若能守之, 
萬物將自化] .  (Laozi 37, trans. Chan 1963: 166) 
The concept ziran expresses a commitment to a more inclusive view of 
life than that articulated in Confucian philosophy, which is, as we have 
seen, fundamentally grounded in human relationships (qin qin 親親) (Liu 
2006: 61). Even though these personal relationships gradually flourish into 
general compassion for everyone (fan ai zhong 汎愛眾), the concept ziran is 
resolutely inclusive. It incorporates a broader concern for all life without 
preferring the human. 
Appreciation of other species and awareness of the natural environment 
are also expressed in the Zhuangzi. While the text does not single out 
human-centeredness for criticism, it offers accounts from the perspective 
of many other different beings, hence implicitly challenging the human 
perspective as the only valid and authoritative one. The Zhuangzi is 
concerned more broadly with those who claim exclusivity and, in the 
allegory that compares (human) speech with the cheeping of chickens, the 
text rejects those whose views claim to be singularly correct (Zhuangzi, “Qi 
Wu Lun” 齊物論). To facilitate these discussions, the Zhuangzi sets out 
arguments from the perspectives of birds, fish, crickets and monkeys, which 
parody the confined nature of particular doctrines and their attendant 
conceptions of human good. 
Notwithstanding the subtle differences in Daoist and Confucian 
conceptions of selfhood, both philosophies share a view of the individual-
in-environment. An interesting expression of this idea is presented by 
David Hall and Roger Ames. They articulate the idea of embeddedness 
with reference to the concepts of field and focus. According to this view, an 
individual, a focus or focal point, is necessarily situated within a field, its 
context. It is only with respect to an individual’s place in the field that we 
 can fully understand its actions, commitments, achievements, and the like: 
A particular is a focus that is both defined by and defines a context—a field. The 
field     is hologrammatic; that is, it is so constituted that each discriminate “part” 
contains the adumbrated whole. (Hall and Ames 1987: 238) 
According to Hall and Ames, the theme of embeddedness is present in 
both Daoism and Confucianism; they suggest that the schema of focus and 
field best captures the distinctiveness of this theme.13 As we will see later, 
the conception of individual-in-environment has many important 
implications for Chinese philosophy. Not only does it support a distinctive 
conception of selfhood, it also generates a practical approach to matters by 
focusing on contextual factors.14 
With respect to our increasing awareness of the natural environment 
and the urgency of the environmental crisis in the present, we should 
draw on conceptual resources in Confucian and Daoist philosophies to 
enlighten our debates. 
For example, the idea of self-in-environment casts doubt on adversarial 
conceptions of humans, nonhumans and the natural environment. More 
specifically, it focuses on relationships, interactions and processes; these are 
aspects of the environment that are overlooked in a simplistic 
 
 
13Hall and Ames state that “Our basic claim is that the early Confucians and Taoists in 
large measure share a common process cosmology defined in terms of “focus” and 
“field.”” (1987: 238– 9). See also Ames and Hall 2003: 11–29. According to Hall and 
Ames, the criteria for assessing the focus-field self are based on the appropriate or most 
fitting action given the circumstances   of that particular situation. This aesthetic mode 
of evaluation, which in Confucianism “permits the mutual interdependence of all things 
to be assessed in terms of particular contexts defined by social roles and functions” 
(Hall and Ames 1987: 248), is called ‘ars contextualis’—the art of contextualization. Ames 
explains how ars contextualis works in practical terms: “[The Classical Chinese] 
expressed a “this-worldly” concern for the concrete details of immediate existence as a 
basis for exercising their minds in the direction of generalities and ideals. They began 
from an acknowledgement of the uniqueness and importance of the particular person 
and the particular historical event to the world, while at the same time, stressing the 
interrelatedness of this person or event with the immediate context” (Ames 1986: 320). 
14Naturally, we would expect many insightful comparisons between Chinese and 
Western philosophy in their conceptions of selfhood and views of embeddedness. It is 
beyond the scope of this discussion to examine the comparisons. 
  
 
understanding of the natural world in purely physicalist terms. To make the 
most of resources available in Chinese philosophy, contemporary 
scholarship might undertake more substantive explorations in this area.15 
 
3 The Socio-political World 
 
In the unstable political climate of the Chunqiu period ( 春 秋 , 722–476 
BCE), Kongzi believed that social rectification was necessary to restore the 
ethico-political order that had prevailed in the earlier part of the Zhou 
dynasty (Lunyu 3.14, 7.5). The Confucians placed the onus on those in 
power, urging them to live ethically- cultivated lives and, through that, to 
provide standards the common people could follow (Lunyu 12.17–19). The 
leader is visible and unshakable, like the North Polar Star (Lunyu 2.1). He 
implements institutions and practices such as zhengming (正名, rectification 
of behaviors to accord with titles), li and yi (Lunyu 13.3, 2.3, 16.10). These 
practices are grounded in the ideal of humaneness (ren), a distinguishing 
characteristic of humanity that must be nurtured in order that all may 
thrive in their shared environment. 
While some aspects of this vision of moral leadership are desirable, 
there is concern about elements of paternalism and authoritarianism in the 
Confucian model of ideal government. Debates on these issues are 
complicated by the fact that the Confucian texts seem to express a range of 
views on the subject matter. The Lunyu itself supports different pictures of 
the roles and responsibilities of those in government and, correspondingly, 
of the people. Some passages in the Lunyu (especially in the “Zi Lu” 子 路 
chapter) express a view of compassionate government, while others such 
as 8.9 seem to deny initiative to ordinary people.16 A well-known passage, 
Lunyu 12.19, may be interpreted to support either of these views. That 
passage reads: 
CHI K’ang Tzu [JI Kangzi] asked Confucius about government, saying, “What 
would you think if, in order to move closer to those who possess the Way, I were 
to kill those who do not follow the Way?” 
Confucius answered, “In administering your government, what need is there for 
you to kill? Just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good. 
The virtue of the gentleman is like wind; the virtue of the small man is like grass. 
[君子之德風. 小人之德草.] Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend. 
[草上之風必偃.]” (trans. Lau 1979: 115–6) 
 
15Lauren Pfister raises some thoughtful questions about the gaps in scholarship in this area; refer to his 
“Environmental Ethics and Some Probing Questions for Traditional Chinese Philosophy.” 
16“The common people may be made to follow a path, but not to understand it.” “民可使由之, 不可使知之.” 
An interesting discussion of the tension between the complementary roles—or competing roles, as the case 
may be—is provided by William De Bary 1991. 
 On the one hand, this passage seems to emphasize the moral influence of 
the ruler who uses nonviolent measures to bring about social stability. On 
the other, there is an element of unequal power: the grass must (bi 必) bend 
when the wind is upon it. 
Among the early Confucians, Mengzi’s view of the government and the 
populace is considered the most compassionate, since he emphasized the 
centrality of benevolence to ideal government (Mengzi 2A.3–6, 1A.7). In 
contrast, Xunzi’s view of government is often criticized for its authoritarian 
overtones, especially as he also emphasized fa (penal laws) as an instrument 
of governance. The issue of how we are to understand the Confucian theory 
of leadership cannot be resolved here (see Angle 2002). However, below we 
will revisit some aspects of Confucian government as we compare the roles 
of government and the people in Daoist and Confucian thought. 
The Daoist view of government is often explained in terms of the concept 
wuwei (non-action or non-conditional action) (e.g., Laozi 3, 37, 57, 64). The 
meaning of wuwei varies across the passages in the Laozi and it is not 
possible to spell out a definitive Daoist vision of government from the text 
alone. One possible way to understand Daoist wuwei government is to 
emphasize its non-coercive nature and democratic approach: 
聖人無常心, 
以百姓心為心. . .   
聖人在天下歙歙, 
為天下渾其心 ... (Laozi 49, WANG Bi version, Liu 2006: 486).  
 
The sage does not have an inflexible mind-heart 
He takes on the people’s mind-heart as his own . . . 
In the world, the sage regards all without conscious judgment (like breathing in 
and out). He merges his mind-heart with those of the people (Author’s 
translation) 
Unlike the paradigmatic Confucian leader who stands apart from the 
common people, as visible as the North Polar star (Lunyu 2.1), the Daoist 
sage does not establish standards on behalf of the people in order to 
regulate their lives. Benjamin Schwartz describes this as a “laissez-faire” 
approach to government (1985: 213). Yet, on the other hand, there are 
passages in the Laozi that seem to suggest methods of statecraft—such as 
the strategy of “stooping to conquer” (Laozi 36, 66)—and military strategy 
(Laozi 30) (ibid. 213–4).17 
 
17Schwartz suggests that these passages on methods of statecraft and military strategy 
are aligned with the Huang-Lao tradition (1985: 213–4). 
  
 
The Laozi rejects attempts by government to (over-)regulate the lives of 
the people: “The more proscriptions there are in the world, the more 
impoverished the people’s  lives  will  be   The  more  laws  and  orders  
are  pronounced,  the  more thieves there will be.” [天下多忌諱, 而民彌貧; .     
法令滋彰, 盜賊多有.] (Laozi 57, author’s translation; Chinese text from 
WANG Bi version, Liu 2006: 552–3). The Laozi challenges conventional 
values and pursuits: 
為學日益, 為道日損。 
損之又損, 
以至於無為 .... (Laozi 48, Wang Bi version, Liu 2006: 480) 
Pursue learning and one increases daily, pursue dao and one decreases daily. One 
decreases and further decreases until one is no longer conditioned [in one’s 
thoughts and actions]. . (Author’s translation. See also Laozi 2, 10, 63) 
In this regard, if we understand Confucianism simply to be promoting a 
conventional set of values and practices,18 then Daoist philosophy would 
be antagonistic to Confucianism. Yet, as we have seen in our discussions 
about the interactions between Confucianism and Daoism, this is only one 
way of understanding the relationship between the two. 
The few references to wuwei in the Zhuangzi “Neipian” refer directly to 
the comportment and inner tranquility of the Daoist sage. The most 
significant reference to wuwei appears in connection with the perfect man 
who applies his mind-heart (xin 心) like a mirror19: 
無為名尸, 無為謀府, 無為事任, 無為知主. ... 至人之用心若鏡, 不將不迎, 應而不藏, 
故能勝物而不傷. (Zhuangzi ji shi, “Ying Di Wang” 應帝王 1961: 307) 
Do not attempt to be the owner of fame, do not act only according to plans, do 
not be burdened with affairs, do not be the master of wisdom. The perfect man 
employs his heart-mind like a mirror; he does not support things or receive them, 
he responds but does not store. Hence, he deals successfully with things and does 
not injure them. (Author’s translation) 
This passage must be understood in connection with the text’s disquiet 
about the nature of the sage’s political involvement. More specifically, it is 
cautious about tensions arising from the enlightened sage’s engagement 
with the concerns of society.20 Despite differences in the two views of 
political involvement, Confucianism also emphasizes the equanimity of the 
leader (Lunyu 9.29), especially when he deals with different and new 
situations (Lunyu 2.11). 
 
18Refer to the discussion by Hourdequin 2004 on understanding Confucian thought primarily 
in terms of the institutionalization of convention within society. 
19Graham argues that the mirror metaphor is not associated with a ‘surrender to passions’ but 
rather ‘impersonal calm which mirrors the situation with utmost clarity’ (2001: 14; 16). 
20Four of the seven “Neipian” of the Zhuangzi are preoccupied with this question (“Ren Jian Shi” 
〈人間世〉; “De Chong Fu” 〈德充符〉; “Da Zong Shi” 〈大宗師〉 and “Ying Di Wang” 〈應帝王〉. 
 A number of questions concerning the concept wuwei will illuminate 
our discussion of Daoist and Confucian conceptions of government. The 
first concerns the level of regulative activity: just how much regulation is 
enough or optimal? Should there be no regulation at all such that people 
live in a primitivist society of the kind evoked in Laozi 81? Or, if there are 
optimal levels of regulation, what are their criteria? While Confucian 
philosophy upholds particular measures and institutions as prerequisites 
of good government, Daoist wuwei is notoriously ambiguous. This could 
be because wuwei is incompatible with the promotion of standards in the 
way other thinkers, including the Confucians, have proposed. To steer 
clear of imposing measures that serve only to restrict the lives of the 
people, Daoist government might have to refrain from being 
prescriptivist. However, if Daoist philosophy cannot supply clear answers 
regarding regulative activity, the Confucian might say to the Daoist: 
All very well for the Daoists who relish philosophical activity and who encourage 
directionless wandering. This promotes the free, individual human spirit. But we need     
to find the best way—the most effective in achieving social harmony through human 
attachment. And it must be the best way for us all, not just the best from where each of   
us sits. Collectively we must explore paths that lead to better conditions for humanity 
than what we now have. (Lai 2006: 148–9) 
A second and related question probes further: to what extent does the 
government control or regulate the life of society? Might we understand 
wuwei as a passive form of government, in contrast to Confucian 
government that actively sets out standards for the common people? Or is 
the contrast along these lines too simplistic? Perhaps important differences 
lie not in the level of activity but in the type of activity undertaken by the 
government.21 Laozi 17 presents a description of different governmental 
styles: 
太上, 下知有之。 
其次, 親而譽之。 
其次, 畏之。其次, 侮之。
信不足,  焉有不信焉。悠
兮其貴言。 
功成事遂, 百姓皆謂我自然。 (WANG Bi version, Liu 2006: 205) 
With the most excellent rulers, their subjects only know that they are there, 
The next best are the rulers they love and praise, 
Next are the rulers they hold in awe, 
And the worst are the rulers they disparage. 
Where there is a lack of credibility, 
There is a lack of trust. 
Vigilant, they are careful in what they say. 
With all things accomplished and the work complete 
The common people say, “We are spontaneously like this.” (trans. Ames and Hall 2003: 
101–3) 
 
 
 
21For extended discussions of wuwei in the Laozi, refer to Ames 1994: 33–46, Lai 2007: 332–4, Schwartz 1985: 
210–5 and Slingerland 2003: 107–17. 
  
 
The Confucian sage is held in high moral regard by the people (Lunyu 
12.7, 2.1) and hence it cannot be said that his existence is barely known. 
However, like the Daoist leader, he is neither despised nor feared. 
Furthermore, the interdependence between the ruler and the people in the 
Confucian ideal society may also be described in terms of wuwei: if the 
ruler is capable in facilitating the institutions of li and yi, social order will 
eventuate as if naturally. Lunyu 15.5 states that the sage-king Shun (舜) 
adopted a wuwei approach to government. Although this is an isolated 
occurrence of wuwei in the Lunyu, the Zhongyong, a later Confucian text, 
picks up on the theme of the subtle effectiveness of the Confucian sage:  
“[Zhong Ni, Confucius] handed down the doctrines of Yao and Shun . . . 
taking them as his model. . .  He may be compared to heaven and earth in 
their supporting and containing, their overshadowing and curtaining, 
all things. He may be compared to the four seasons in their alternating 
progress, and to the sun and moon in their successive shining. All 
things are nourished together without their injuring one another” 
(Zhongyong 30, trans. Legge 1981: 110–1). 
 
Although the Confucian leader is by comparison more actively involved 
in leading the people and coordinating the institutions and social 
processes, like the Daoist leader, he avoids coercion. The Confucian leader 
seeks to transform society through example rather than coercion (e.g., 
Lunyu 13.6; Mengzi 2A.3). We see elements of this model of leadership in 
Kongzi’s own behavior toward his students: he does not coerce students 
into sharing his views (e.g., Lunyu 17.21, 7.8; see Liu 2006: 211–3). 
A further similarity in both philosophies is that the sage-ruler creates or 
facilitates situations and environments that benefit the people. In Daoism, 
the image of  water is used to represent the beneficence of the sage’s 
government (Laozi 8). Confucian government seeks also to benefit the 
people: “wishing to establish himself, he also establishes others; wishing to 
extend himself, he also helps others extend themselves.” (己欲立而立人, 
己欲達而達人, from Lunyu 6:30, author’s translation). In Mengzi 1A:7, in 
conversation with King Xuan ( 宣 王 ), Mengzi considers certain 
conditions of life that are a prerequisite (本 ben) for the cultivation of 
morality. He advises the King to ensure that these conditions are met so 
that people have time to develop and practice commitment to propriety (li)
 and rightness (yi). Households should have five mu22 of land on which 
mulberry trees are planted for silk. There should be chickens, pigs and 
dogs, and labor to work the fields. Finally, it is important to provide for 
education in village schools. These details are not merely of anecdotal 
worth. Rather, they demonstrate a level of thoughtfulness in Mengzi’s 
vision of good government. We should also note the remarkable comment 
made by Mengzi that “The people are of supreme importance; the altars to 
the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler” (Mengzi 7B.14, 
trans. Lau 1979: 315). 
While Confucian and Daoist views of government differ in regard to 
their idea of regulative activity, they both emphasize government that 
benefits the people. In this sense, both philosophies stand in contrast to 
Legalist philosophy that conceives of political power in terms of the tension 
between the ruler and the people.23 
In the final comparison, we turn to the nature of harmony in Daoist and 
Confucian philosophies. The Confucian conception of ideal society is 
grounded in reciprocal (shu 恕 ) and complementary relationships. 
Relationships are complementary in that they embody specific 
responsibilities and obligations of particular relational positions (e.g., 
Lunyu 1.2, 13.18). The Mengzi highlights three relationships in particular: 
father and son, sovereign and minister, and husband and wife (3A.4). 
While these are unequal relationships, they should not be construed 
simply in terms of a power-hierarchy. Confucian thought emphasizes the 
responsibilities of each person in a relationship to attend to the needs of 
the other. For example, the filiality of children is a fitting response to 
parental care and nurturing through the years (e.g., Lunyu 2.6–8). A main 
task of the Confucian leader is to ensure that people understand their 
responsibilities and obligations in specific relationships so that interactions 
can occur smoothly; this is a basic requirement of social order (Lunyu 13.3). 
On one occasion, Kongzi comments that a youth had overstepped 
boundaries: 
A youth from the Que village would carry messages for the Master. Someone 
asked Confucius, “Is he making any progress?” The Master replied, “I have seen 
him sitting in places reserved for his seniors, and have seen him walking side by 
side with his elders. This is someone intent on growing up quickly rather than on 
making progress.” (Lunyu 14.44; trans. Ames and Rosemont 1998: 183) 
 
 
22Measure of land area. 
23See for example the discussions in Schwartz 1985: 321–49 and Graham 1989: 267–92. 
  
 
The youth’s attempts to assume equal status with people more senior 
were inappropriate: “ ... such violations have the potential to undermine 
the finely tuned harmony in Confucian society” (Lai 2006a: 61–5). 
Daoist conceptions of complementarity and harmony are more 
philosophically complex. In the Laozi, opposites are not the antitheses of 
each other. Although one polarity is emphasized (non-assertiveness 
[buzheng 不爭], softness [rou 柔], tranquility [jing 靜]), both polarities are 
embraced (Laozi 36, 66, 78). Instead of potential conflict between opposites, 
the Laozi upholds flux: first one polarity gains precedence, then the other, 
almost as if in cyclical turn-taking (Lau 1963: 27). 
The Zhuangzi’s stance on contrast and difference was another unusual 
one for its day. Most other thinkers believed that a common standard 
would bring about social cohesion. To that end, the Confucians 
emphasized zhengming and li, and Mohists and Legalists both upheld fa 
explicitly in recognition of the importance of standards. For the Mohists, fa 
would regulate many areas of life, ranging from carpentry to human 
behavior. For the Legalists, however, fa was a standard for behavior backed 
by the threat of penal law. In his response to the oppositional verbal 
wrangling, Zhuangzi celebrates the diversity of perspectives as they reflect 
the plurality in the natural world: 
When a human sleeps in the damp his waist hurts and he gets stiff in the joints; is 
that so of the loach? When he sits in a tree he shivers and shakes; is that so of the 
ape? Which of these three knows the right place to live? (Zhuangzi, “Qiwulun,” 
trans. Graham 2001: 58) 
Both the Laozi and Zhuangzi seem to suggest that a cacophony of 
different voices or views is the optimal condition for society. While some 
Laozi passages advocate non-conformism (Laozi 20, 48, 58, 64), the Zhuangzi 
goes further to highlight the importance of having different criteria for 
assessing different situations (especially in the “Qiwulun” chapter). Here, 
we may again draw on the concept ziran. In addition to its other 
inflections, ziran may also be understood in terms of spontaneity, in other 
words, “what-is-so-of-itself” (Waley 1934: 174). This aspect of ziran refers 
to the spontaneity of individuals uncompromised by conformism.  In this 
sense, ziran is the fitting corollary of the concept wuwei: if spontaneity is  to 
be encouraged, wuwei must be the modus operandi of Daoist government 
(Lai 2007: 332–7). To put it in negative terms, a government that seeks to 
instill standard 
 practices and patterns of behavior is not allowing people to express 
initiative and spontaneity. Hence, the concepts ziran and wuwei may be 
understood to have important ethical implications both in the political 
realm and in personal life: 
From the Daoist point of view, the common people under the Confucian, Moist, 
and Legalist schemes will not possess the flexibility to respond in a way that 
expresses their spontaneity—either because they are constrained . . . or they have 
not been encouraged to do so. At the socio-political level, non-coercive measures 
include avoidance of inflexible, absolutist ideals, and unilateral and dictatorial 
methodologies, as well as promotion of those that engender a measure of 
individual self-determination. These are fundamental elements of a government 
that encourages participation of its people in its governing processes. At a 
personal level, an individual moral agent embraces wuwei by recognizing the 
distinctness, separateness, and spontaneity of the other. (Lai 2007: 334) 
In summary, we have seen that both Daoist and Confucian visions of 
government incorporate the welfare of the people as an important 
objective. However, while Daoism supports plurality, Confucianism 
emphasizes unity. From a Confucian perspective, harmony is the result of 
careful orchestration. The government (or the Confucian paradigmatic 
person, the junzi, 君子) may be likened to a conductor of an orchestra. He 
is in charge of how the orchestra performs, setting the pace and the tone of 
the “performance” (Lai 2006b). In contrast, Daoist society may be likened 
to an ensemble of skilled musicians who are attuned to, and respond 
spontaneously to, each other. If one of these musicians is also the leader of 
the ensemble, his or her presence qua leader is barely felt; perhaps he or she 
only cues the ensemble in and thereafter does not dominate in their 
performance. 
The idea of spontaneity and responsiveness is emphasized in 
Zhuangzi’s many examples of skill—like those of Butcher Ding (丁) or the 
hunchback cicada catcher. In the following section, we extend our 
discussion of spontaneity and skill in Daoist philosophy, and compare 
them with models of self-cultivation in Confucian philosophy. 
 
4 Cultivation of the Self 
 
The Confucian and Daoist conceptions of self-in-environment draw 
attention to the vulnerabilities, as well as the potential, of the individual. 
Changes in the environment may impact on the individual, just as an 
individual’s actions may have far-reaching effects on others and its 
environment. According to this view of the self, a plausible conception of 
the good life must include consideration of an individual’s character, 
relationships, circumstances, adaptability and so on. To this end, 
Confucian philosophy focuses on self-cultivation (xiushen 修身), while 
  
 
Daoist philosophy discusses methods such as wuwei for navigating 
through situations and optimizing one’s benefits. Naturally, we would 
expect that these conceptions of self- in-environment are associated with 
accounts of ethics that differ significantly from those derived in abstraction 
from the vicissitudes of lived practical life. 
In Confucian philosophy, the paradigmatic person assists in the processes 
and institutions of society to bring about a better life for all (e.g., Lunyu 6.30; 
The Great Learning (Daxue) 大學). The deliberations in Confucian texts 
from pre-Qin and Han periods, as well as later Neo-Confucian 
discussions, attempt to work through the details of the cultivation of such 
a person. Xiushen in Confucianism involves the gradual attunement of the 
individual to the broader, more inclusive concerns of humanity, and, 
finally, to those of tian. Lunyu 2:4 sets out the developmental path of Kongzi: 
The Master said: “From fifteen, my [heart-mind] was set upon learning; from 
thirty I took my stance; from forty I was no longer doubtful; from fifty I realized 
the propensities of tian (tianming 天命); from sixty my ear was attuned; from 
seventy I could give my [heart-mind] free rein without overstepping the 
boundaries.” (Trans. Ames and Rosemont, Jr. 1998: 76–7) 
Xiushen is not mere behavioral compliance. It refers to a deeper moral 
com- mitment to the orientation of ren and tian. A key Confucian concept, 
xin (心 the heart-mind), is the distinctively human capacity for compassion 
and empathy (e.g., Mengzi 2A.6). Properly developed, it underlies 
expressions of human affection and concern. In that sense, the concept xin 
brings together the “inner” and “outer” in two important ways. First, it 
draws attention to the centrality of relationships to the self. Second, it 
emphasizes the importance of the social environment to the life of an 
individual. The discussions of xin and its cultivation both in primary texts 
and contemporary debates are too extensive to dwell on here. Suffice to 
note at this point that Xunzi, whose philosophy has often been criticized 
for its authoritarian undertone, nevertheless articulates an elegant picture 
of the cultivated person. Passages like the following establish Xunzi’s 
significance as a Confucian thinker: 
The gentleman, knowing well that learning that is incomplete and impure does not 
deserve to be called fine, recites and enumerates his studies that he will be familiar 
with them, ponders over them and searches into them that he will full penetrate their 
meaning, acts in his person that they will come to dwell within him, and eliminates 
what is harmful within him that he will hold on to them and be nourished by them. 
Thereby he causes his eye     to be unwilling to see what is contrary to it, his ear 
unwilling to hear what is contrary to  it, his mouth unwilling to speak anything 
contrary to it, and his mind [ 心 ] unwilling to contemplate anything contrary to it. 
When he has reached the limit of such perfection, he finds delight in it. (Xunzi, 
“Quanxue” 1.15; trans. Knoblock 1999: 21–3) 
 
 Xunzi expresses optimism in the ability of individuals to bring about 
moral transformation. Needless to say, this task is an arduous, lifelong 
commitment (see also Lunyu 1.14–15, 8.7). It involves discipline in all areas 
of life: looking (見 jian: e.g., Lunyu 2.18), listening (wen 聞 : e.g., Lunyu 7.28), 
observing (guan 觀 : e.g., Lunyu 2.10), practicing behavioral propriety (li 禮: 
e.g., Lunyu 12.1), learning from others (xue 學: e.g., Lunyu 6.3), having 
discussions with others (yan 言: e.g., Lunyu 1:15), reading and discussing 
classical texts such as the Classic of Odes (Shijing 詩經) and the Record of Rites 
(Liji) (Lunyu 16.13), engaging in reflective activities (思si: e.g., Lunyu 2.15) 
and cultivating friendships (qingren 親仁) with those who are committed to 
humaneness (Lunyu 1.6).24 
While a significant portion of Confucian cultivation involves learning 
from precedent (for example, from the sage-kings), classical texts and 
tradition (such as behavioral rituals, li), Daoist philosophy rejects learning 
from conventional sources: 
The person who takes conventionally-prescribed action (wei 
為) fails. The person who grasps will lose. 
Therefore the sage takes unconditioned and non-controlling action (無為) and 
hence does not fail . . . 
He learns (xue 學) not to abide by conventional norms (buxue 不學)... (Laozi 64, 
author’s translation. See also Laozi 20) 
The Zhuangzi likewise rejects appeals to received wisdom. Examples of 
skill there involve people in ordinary occupations—such as the butcher 
Ding  ( 庖  丁in “Yang Sheng Zhu”), the wheelwright Bian ( 扁 [“flat”] in 
“Tian Dao” 天 道 ) and the cicada catcher (in “Da Sheng” 達 生 ). 
Nevertheless, their command of their respective skills is extraordinary. 
Although these skills have been variously described by scholars as 
involving intuition, it is clear that they are not untrained responses (Lai 
2008: 112). They have been painstakingly nurtured over long periods of 
time. The butcher, for instance, has trained in his profession for nineteen 
years. Unlike the case in Confucianism, however, these skills are not the 
result of official training but of everyday practice. 
The example of the wheelwright is particularly important in setting out 
contrasts between Confucian and Daoist approaches to cultivation. In a 
conversation with Huan Gong (桓公), the wheelwright says that his skills 
cannot be fully expressed in words. In fact, he has failed to teach them to his 
own son because of their ineffability: 
 
 
 
24Refer to Lai (2006a: 109–24) for a detailed discussion of the cultivation of skills in 
Confucianism. 
  
 
If I chip at a wheel too slowly, the chisel slides and does not grip; if too fast, it 
jams and catches in the wood. Not too slow,  not too fast; I feel it in the hand and 
respond from    the heart, the mouth cannot put it into words, there is a knack in 
it somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son cannot learn 
from me. This is how through my seventy years I have grown old chipping at 
wheels. The men of old and their untransmittable message are dead. Then what 
my lord is reading is the dregs of the men of old, isn’t it? (“Tian Dao,” trans. 
Graham 2001: 140) 
Here, the text turns the tables on aspects of Confucianism: the wheelwright, 
a tradesperson untutored in the comportment and intellectual 
accomplishments of courtly life, challenges the wisdom of Huan Gong (who 
happens to be reading a book). The details of this encounter are remarkable 
in that they reveal an astute awareness of the subtler differences between 
Confucian and Daoist commitments. Daoist cultivation focuses on 
nurturing people who can creatively implement their skills; Confucian 
cultivation is aimed primarily at those who can lead others to attain various 
levels of meaningful engagement with others in society. Although both 
involve mental discipline,25 Daoist cultivation is more open-ended than 
Confucian cultivation as the former aims to avoid conventional and 
normative ways. Daoist philosophy avoids over-reliance on convention and 
tradition since that may stifle the spontaneity of individuals. Both the Laozi 
and the Zhuangzi discuss the extrication of lives from convention (e.g., Laozi 
48; Zhuangzi “Da Zong Shi”).  The Zhuangzi expresses this in terms of the 
concept zuowang (坐 忘 sitting and forgetting). To put it simply, zuowang 
refers to an “un-learning” process whereby a person forgets received 
values, traditions and practices.26 In Daoism, the effort to realize dao 
focuses centrally on the individual while in Confucianism the realization 
of ren, yi,  li and zhi are coordinated processes (cf.,  Liu 2006: 492–3, 682–
3).  In both traditions, however, the emphasis of cultivation is ultimately to 
nurture people who can effectively implement particular ideals within their 
contexts. In this regard, both philosophies are committed to “the primacy of 
practice, the arduous nature of cultivation, the rigor and intensity with which 
the learner or apprentice approaches his or her tasks, and the impressive 
fluency and beauty of their execution” (Lai 2008: 112).  
 
25Here, we only need to imagine the mental discipline of the cicada catcher. The point 
here is that there is mental discipline as well and practice is not simply thought of in 
behaviourist terms. Nevertheless, we must be mindful of attempts to characterize the 
mental in pre-Qin Chinese philosophy as if it were detached from the physiological. Even 
on its own, the notion of xin (mind- heart) challenges such simplistic dichotomies. 
26It is important to understand the fuller implications of zuowang within the context of 
the Zhuangzi. We must especially focus on Zhuangzi’s hesitations about involvement in 
political life in the terms set out by society then. See footnote 20.
 Analyses of the spirit of Chinese philosophy and its reasoning strategies 
have noted its attention to questions concerning how best to live. FENG 
Youlan (FUNG Yu-lan 馮友蘭, 1895–1990), an influential Chinese thinker of 
the modern period, suggests that the practical orientation of Chinese 
philosophy is one of its distinctive characteristics.  He expresses this in 
terms of the theme of neisheng waiwang (內聖外王 ), “inner sageliness 
and outer kingliness” (Feng 1948:  8–10).  This theme emphasizes the 
continuity between “inner” ethical commitment and “outer” behavior. 
Feng’s purpose is to note that using the terms inner (nei) and outer (wai) as 
exclusive categories is an inaccurate way of understanding Chinese 
philosophy. In Chinese philosophy, a person’s ethical commitment will have 
practical outcomes, just as her behavior and comportment are indicative of 
her ethical commitment. The cultivation of the self is integral to the good life 
for both the individual and others around him. 
It follows from the attention to individuals, their relationships and 
contexts in Chinese philosophy, that reasoning and evaluation are not 
conducted on the basis of a transcendentally- and abstractly-derived logical 
order. This has important implications for the reasoning style in Chinese 
philosophy, as noted by Roger Ames: 
[The classical Chinese] expressed a “this-worldly” concern for the concrete details 
of immediate existence as a basis for exercising their minds in the direction of 
generalities and ideals. They began from an acknowledgement of the uniqueness 
and importance of the particular person and the particular historical event to the 
world, while at the same time, stressing the interrelatedness of this person or event 
with the immediate context. (1986: 320) 
While Feng focuses on the issue from the perspective of personal reflection 
in moral self cultivation, Ames focuses on the logic that underlies 
reasoning in Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, common to both their 
analyses is attention to the practical import of reasoning in Chinese thought. 
Here, reasoning does not involve a top-down imposition of preconceived 
standards or ideals, but rather careful consideration of relevant aspects of a 
situation including the individuals involved, their relationships, the complex 
causalities, outcomes, and existing norms and values. According to this 
view, morality is not centrally a question of whether correct principles might 
have been adhered to or transgressed against but rather how they have been 
applied to maximize the outcomes not only for the individual but for others, 
and for society more generally. Models of cultivation in Confucian and 
Daoist philosophies can contribute in significant ways to contemporary 
discussions of morality and personal development. It is especially because 
the focus in both philosophies is on the methods and processes of cultivation, and 
not grounded in particular transcendental or normative values, that we may draw 
on them to enlighten contemporary debates in the globalized context. 
  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Important differences as well as similarities exist between Confucian and 
Daoist philosophies. It is important to understand their subtle differences 
as these nuances help to deepen our understanding of each of them. The 
differences covered here include conceptions of individual freedom, the 
scope of governmental regulation, difference and complementarity, and 
harmony and social order. The similarities between Confucianism and 
Daoism are significant, too, as they are often also the distinctive 
characteristics of Chinese philosophy. This discussion has highlighted their 
common features such as the conception of the self-in-environment, 
attention to relationships, and a practical orientation. These are important 
aspects of the conceptual framework of Chinese thought and they help to 
establish Chinese philosophy as a unique field in philosophical studies. 
Our understanding of these comparisons is enhanced by greater 
awareness of Chinese intellectual history, in particular of cross-influences 
between the traditions, as well as historical contingencies and 
circumstances that may have shaped their ideas and reasoning styles. Since 
this discussion considers Daoism and Confucianism primarily during the 
pre- Qin period, readers are encouraged to explore the continuing 
engagements between the two philosophies as they continued to evolve in 
Chinese intellectual history. The discussions here highlights the need for 
more detailed comparisons of the concepts, themes, and philosophical 
frameworks across the Chinese philosophical traditions, as well as those 
between Chinese philosophies and the philosophies of other cultures. 
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